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John P. Caskey 
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange: 
Adapting to Survive in Changing Markets 
This article analyzes the evolution of the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange (PHLX), America's oldest stock exchange, from 1950 
through 2000. PHLX was able to compete against the much 
larger New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) because it exploited 
loopholes created by fixed minimum trading commissions 
prior to 1975. After the liberalization of commissions, the 
PHLX competed against the NYSE by offering automated exe 
cutions that met the needs of discount brokers. It also moved 
early to trade equity options and developed the first exchange 
based market for foreign currency options. 
The 
evolution of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) during 
the second half of the twentieth century constitutes a compelling 
story for several reasons. For one, very little has been written about 
the regional stock exchanges, and even many financial economists are 
uncertain about what they do and why they do it. By focusing on one 
particular regional exchange, I can provide a rich account of its opera 
tions and business strategies. At the same time, since most of the other 
surviving regional exchanges shared many of the characteristics of 
the PHLX, an account of its evolution provides a perspective on the 
JOHN P. CASKEY is professor in the Department of Economics at Swarthmore College. 
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development of the regional exchanges generally. In addition, an analy 
sis of the progressive transformation of the PHLX necessarily entails 
background profiles of the many profound changes in the structure of 
securities markets that occurred in the second half of the twentieth cen 
tury. Finally, the evolution of the PHLX is in itself a fascinating case 
study of business strategy and adaptation to major competitive and 
regulatory shocks. 
In examining this half-century in the history of the PHLX, I iden 
tify three distinct periods. The first runs from the 1950s through 1974.1 
begin in the 1950s in order to capture the postwar characteristics of the 
regional stock exchanges and the challenges they faced in attracting or 
ders away from the New York Stock Exchange. I end the first period in 
1974, because this is the last year that exchanges could, and did, specify 
minimum commissions that nonmembers had to pay in order to trade 
on the exchanges. In addition, during this period, the PHLX only traded 
equities, not the options that became important to it in later years. The 
second period begins in 1975 and ends in 1983. This is an era of great 
innovation for the PHLX, as it introduced automated routing and exe 
cution of retail equity trades and began to trade equity options, equity 
index options, and foreign-currency options. The third period runs 
from 1984 through 2000. During this era, while the PHLX enjoyed the 
benefits of its earlier diversification into options, it also had to confront 
new regulatory and competitive threats to the successful market niches 
it had created. 
Before telling the story of the evolution of the PHLX, I will explain 
a recurring theme in this account. Economic theory would tend to pre 
dict that there would be only one exchange to trade any particular secu 
rity or group of securities, in large part because securities markets are 
subject to "network effects."1 This simply means that people buying (or 
selling) a security will generally want to go to the market center where 
the largest number of others are selling (or buying) the same security. 
By following this strategy, they maximize their chances of receiving the 
best price and completing the transaction quickly. This point, which is 
often summed up by the phrase "liquidity attracts liquidity," has impor 
tant implications. If an exchange, for example, gains a dominant mar 
ket share in trading a particular security, all trading of the security may 
quickly move to that market. In other words, network effects can create 
natural monopolies for securities exchanges. In determining which 
exchange becomes the location for trading a particular security, there is 
1 For a clear, nontechnical discussion of network efforts in trading systems and factors af 
fecting competition among markets, see Larry Harris, Trading and Exchanges: Market Mi 
crostructure for Practitioners (New York, 2003). 
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a "first mover" advantage. The exchange that first gains a dominant 
market share, perhaps because it is the first to trade the security, is 
more likely to become the monopoly center than later entrants. 
Over the course of the half-century that I examine here, the Phila 
delphia stock exchange managed to survive, and sometimes to thrive, 
while capturing only a relatively minor share of total national trading of 
exchange-listed stocks and equity options. If network effects are signif 
icant, one would expect it to have folded as trading migrated to far 
larger market centers, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
for exchange-listed equities and the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
for exchange-traded options. Why didn't this happen? 
In what follows, I explain how the PHLX was able to compete 
against these much larger rivals. But to summarize the answer at the 
outset, a number of factors came into play, including high communica 
tion costs in the PHLX's earliest years; restrictive membership and list 
ing standards on the NYSE; efforts by institutions to evade fixed trad 
ing commissions; a differentiation of trading technologies to appeal to 
particular order-flow providers; government regulations and, perhaps, 
implicit collusion among exchanges that allowed them to monopolize 
the trading of specific equity option contracts; and the development of 
new products that were not traded on other exchanges. All these fac 
tors have, at different times, accounted for the ability of the PHLX to 
overcome the network effects that would otherwise undermine the 
ability of a small securities exchange to coexist alongside much larger 
exchanges.2 
Before exploring the three distinct eras in the history of the PHLX 
outlined above, I will set the context for the 1950s by briefly reviewing 
the evolution of the PHLX prior to that time. 
The Early Years 
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange dates its founding to the 1790 li 
censing of the Philadelphia Board of Brokers, making it the oldest stock 
2 For a theoretical discussion of sources of competitive advantage and the implications for 
business strategies, see Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New 
York, 1990). Porter also provides numerous case studies from a variety of countries to sup 
port his theory of competitive advantage. One can easily apply the theory to competition 
among securities markets, but the factors emphasized in the theory should be modified in 
two ways to fit this industry more closely. First, where Porter emphasizes geographic cluster 
ing that can result from agglomeration economies, in securities markets it is the network ef 
fects that promote the clustering of trades within a single market center. Second, competition 
within securities markets and the structure of those markets are heavily shaped by govern 
ment regulations. 
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exchange in the country.3 Between its founding and the mid-nineteenth 
century, the Philadelphia exchange mainly traded government debt 
and the securities of local banks, insurance companies, and bridge and 
turnpike companies.4 
Although the New York Stock Exchange was founded about two 
years after the PHLX, it soon surpassed the PHLX in trading volume. 
As the legal historians Walter Werner and Stephen Smith write, "Reli 
able comparisons for the trading years 1837-1840 reveal that reported 
share volume in Philadelphia was on average 13.9 percent of the vol 
ume in New York. . . ."5 The prominence of the NYSE was due to New 
York's preeminent position in commerce generally. New York, unlike 
Philadelphia, was linked to the Great Lakes region as a result of the 
1825 completion of the Erie Canal, and its ports were better positioned 
for shipping back and forth to Europe. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, an increasing share of 
the trading in financial securities, especially transactions carried out 
by the largest firms or government entities, migrated to the NYSE be 
cause of the liquidity and depth of that market. But relatively high 
communication costs enabled the regional exchanges to compete in the 
first half of the century. Philadelphians could not quickly discover the 
prices of securities trading in New York, nor could they quickly trans 
mit trade orders to that city. In other words, communication costs off 
set the tendency for the trading of securities to become concentrated in 
one market center, clearing a space for regional securities exchanges to 
flourish. 
By the 1850s, the United States was actively engaged in developing 
a national telegraph network, which facilitated the creation of large 
national corporations that sought to list their securities on the NYSE 
because they were attracted by the deep pools of capital in New York 
3 Over the years, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange has had a variety of names and office 
locations. But it has always been located in Center City Philadelphia, with one exception. In 
December 1968, in response to a fiscal crisis, Philadelphia imposed a $0.05 per share stock 
transfer tax for all transactions on the PHLX. On January 2,1969, the PHLX moved its trad 
ing floor to an office building just across the street from the city boundaries to avoid the tax. 
In February, a court ruled that the tax was illegal, and the PHLX moved its trading floor back 
to its headquarters in the city. 
4 For data on the volume of trading prior to the 1850s, the types of securities traded, and 
the typical brokerage commissions, see Robert E. Wright, Hamilton Unbound: Finance and 
the Creation of the American Republic (Westport, Conn., 2002). Prior to the twentieth cen 
tury, bonds and preferred stocks were more widely traded on securities exchanges than were 
common stocks. Trading and ownership of equities were limited by poor accounting stan 
dards and confusion about how to value equities. For a good exposition of the evolution of se 
curities markets generally between 1800 and 1940, see Jonathon Barron Baskin and Paul J. 
Miranti Jr., A History of Corporate Finance (New York, 1997). 
5 Walter Werner and Steven T. Smith, Wall Street (New York, 1991), 184. 
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City.6 The development and deployment of the ticker tape during the 
1870s further reinforced the tendency to trade in New York, since it al 
lowed brokers located anywhere in the country nearly contemporane 
ous access to stock prices as they were posted on the NYSE. 
Regional exchanges, including the PHLX, responded to the success 
of the NYSE by setting less demanding listing standards than those re 
quired by the NYSE. This enabled younger and smaller firms with pub 
licly held securities that were unable to meet the listing requirements of 
the NYSE to benefit from an organized secondary market. Such a firm's 
typical path to success would be to list its securities on a regional ex 
change located close to its headquarters or close to a majority of its 
shareholders. Once the firm reached sufficient scale and its securities 
became sufficiently widely held, it would list on the NYSE. In some 
cases, the firm would continue to list its securities on the regional ex 
change even after listing on the NYSE, especially if a large share of its 
securities were owned by individuals or institutions located near the re 
gional exchange. The process of listing securities on a regional ex 
change first in anticipation of eventually moving to the NYSE was 
known as "seasoning."7 Under this system, the exchanges outside New 
York tended to trade the securities of the firms that dominated their re 
gions. In the case of the PHLX, trading toward the end of the nine 
teenth century emphasized the securities of rail systems, mining com 
panies, insurance firms, and local banks.8 
The "Blue Sky" laws that many states enacted in the early twentieth 
century provided an additional incentive for firms to list their securities 
on a regional exchange. These laws offered some protection against 
fraud by requiring that securities sold within a state be registered with 
that state's relevant agency, but states commonly exempted firms whose 
securities were listed on an organized exchange from this registration 
process. The exemption created a strong incentive for firms that were 
unable to meet NYSE listing standards to list their securities on a re 
gional exchange in order to avoid the costs of registering their securi 
ties in multiple states. 
6 For a rich account of how the telegraph influenced U.S. financial markets, see Richard B. 
DuBoff, "The Telegraph and the Structure of Markets in the United States, 1845-1890," 
Research in Economic History 8 (1983): 253-77. 
7 A contemporary financial writer explained, "In general the exchanges outside of New 
York City deal in local securities. In a sense they serve the New York Stock Exchange in some 
what the same manner as does the Curb in trying out new securities. Enterprises which at the 
outset appear as local in scope expand to national proportions and when they do so they 
gravitate to New York." Albert W. Atwood, Modern Business, vol. 20 (New York, 1918), 32. 8 For an explanation of the relatively late development of secondary markets in industrial 
securities, see Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, "The Rise of the Market for Industrial 
Securities, 1887-1902," Business History Review 20 (Spring 1955): 105-38. 
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The major regional exchanges, including the PHLX, boomed in the 
1920s as listings and trading increased rapidly.9 In 1923, for example, 
2.3 million shares were traded on the PHLX, about 1 percent of the vol 
ume of the NYSE. By 1929, 35.5 million shares were traded on the 
PHLX, or about 3.1 percent of NYSE volume. 
In the subsequent stock-market crash and economic depression, 
many of the firms listed on the regional exchanges failed or were ab 
sorbed in mergers, and trading volume fell precipitously. In 1932, for 
example, only 6.6 million shares traded on the PHLX. In addition, 
states changed their Blue Sky laws to limit exemptions for securities 
listed on regional exchanges, and the newly created Securities and Ex 
change Commission (SEC) required the exchanges to impose stricter 
listing requirements. These developments greatly decreased listings 
and trading volume on the regional exchanges.10 Gradually the over 
the-counter (OTC) market replaced the regional exchanges as the loca 
tion where newly issued equities would trade and become seasoned be 
fore the issuing firm might seek a listing on the NYSE or the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), then known as the Curb Exchange. 
As the regional exchanges lost listings and trading volume, they 
responded by starting to trade securities listed on the NYSE and, to a 
lesser extent, on the AMEX. In 1931, for example, the PHLX allowed 
trading to begin in any security listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and 
some regional exchanges. Since these securities were generally not 
listed on the PHLX, this was called "unlisted" trading. Not surprisingly, 
the NYSE challenged the move by the regional exchanges to trade secu 
rities listed on the NYSE, but in a series of decisions during the 1930s, 
the SEC decided in favor of the regional exchanges.11 Within a decade, 
the PHLX and the other regional exchanges were mainly trading securi 
ties listed on the New York exchanges. By 1948, for example, only 1.5 
percent of the dollar volume of stock trading on the PHLX was in secu 
rities listed only on that exchange.12 The majority of stocks traded on 
the PHLX were listed on the NYSE. 
9 The data in this and the subsequent paragraph are found in U.S. Securities and Ex 
change Commission, Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Washington, D.C., 1963), part 2, 916-17. 10 In its 1963 study, the SEC explained that "since the disclosure standards of the new 
statute exceeded the equivalent standards of the principal exchanges, companies meeting 
these standards might well seek the greater publicity and prestige of a listing on the New 
York exchanges in preference to a regional listing .... The new statutory requirements . . . 
also tended to shift the trading of securities from the regional exchanges to the over-the 
counter market. . . . [Securities traded over the counter were free of the requirements now 
attached to securities traded on an exchange." SEC, Special Study, part 2, 918. 11 
Ibid., 919-24. 12 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Eighteenth Annual Report (Washington, 
D.C., 1953), 37 
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The Fixed-Commission Era: 1950-1974 
Since the PHLX was mainly trading the same stocks as the NYSE in 
the 1950s and the NYSE had a much greater volume of business, why 
would brokers route some trades to the PHLX rather than to the NYSE? 
Initially much of the business resulted from the retail trades of regional 
brokerage firms that were not members of the NYSE. In the 1960s, mu 
tual funds directed trades to the regional exchanges to reward broker 
age firms that were not members of the NYSE but that sold shares in 
the mutual finds. Institutions also directed trades to the PHLX, because 
it had created means for institutions to evade exchange-specified mini 
mum public trading commissions. 
Before discussing the reasons that orders came to the PHLX, how 
ever, it is important to explain how the floor of the PHLX functioned. 
As the PHLX evolved into an exchange that mainly traded equities 
listed on the NYSE, it also came to resemble more closely a dealer mar 
ket than an auction market. This was also true of the other regional ex 
changes. In most cases, the only person buying or selling a particular 
stock on the floor of the exchange was the designated specialist. There 
were no competing market makers on the floor, and it was very rare for 
brokers representing buy-and-sell orders to interact directly.13 The 
counterparty to almost all trades was the specialist.14 The specialist's 
profits depended on the spread between his bid and ask price, multi 
plied times the volume of his trades. Because the specialists on the 
PHLX were smaller, more poorly capitalized operators than their coun 
terparts on the NYSE, they typically sought to execute a steady flow of 
small retail orders. 
While the specialists on the PHLX rarely faced competition for or 
ders from the floor of the exchange, they did compete to attract trades 
in equities that were traded on other exchanges. To attract this order 
flow, the specialists would generally guarantee that their prices would 
be as good, or nearly as good, as those quoted on the NYSE. This prac 
tice was common on the regional exchanges. As the SEC explained in its 
13 In some cases, brokers on the floor would execute large orders with each other, but they 
generally negotiated these trades off the floor of the exchange. Brokers would execute the 
prearranged trade, known as a "cross," on the PHLX or another regional exchange rather 
than the NYSE, because there were far fewer limit orders on the books of the regional ex 
changes. The exchanges require that limit orders that offer better prices, or that were entered 
earlier with prices identical to the block transaction, be executed as part of the block trans 
action. A large backlog of limit orders can therefore fragment and complicate a block 
transaction. 
14 
Although the SEC did not provide data specifically for the PHLX, in discussing securi 
ties traded on the NYSE or the AMEX that were also traded on a regional exchange, it stated, 
"The specialist participates as a dealer in approximately 90 percent of all multiple trading on 
the regional exchanges." SEC, Special Study, part 2, 932. 
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1963 study, the regional exchanges sought "to assure investors as good 
an execution on the regional exchange as they might receive on the 
principal market. This led to the development of systems to gear prices 
on the local exchange to those reported on the NYSE ticker tape."15 In 
discussing how this system operated on the PHLX, the SEC noted that a 
specialist would sometimes transact at a price that was one-eighth 
($0,125) lower than the last printed transaction price on the NYSE. 
Brokers who directed orders to these specialists did not consider this to 
be a breach of fiduciary responsibilities to their customers. They rea 
soned that "had the order been sent to New York, there is no certainty 
that the quote is the market in which the customer would have dealt 
since there might have been orders ahead of his or the market might 
have changed by the time his order arrived."16 In a limited set of cases, 
a specialist on the PHLX would match the price quoted on the NYSE. 
As the SEC reported in its 1963 study: 
If there are a great many "prints" of GM at 56 on the NYSE tape the 
[PHLX] specialist will execute the order at 56 without waiting for 
the stock to sell in New York at 56 1/8. The transaction "on volume" 
will occur when the volume of sales in New York at the limit price is 
such as would indicate that the firm can receive an execution at 56 
in New York.17 
Brokers directed orders for securities listed on the NYSE to the 
PHLX for a variety of reasons. Small and medium-sized brokerage firms 
with their headquarters in the mid-Atlantic region were often members 
of the PHLX but not the NYSE, since membership in the PHLX re 
quired far less capital. If such firms received an order to trade a security 
listed on the NYSE and they directed it to a member of the NYSE for ex 
ecution, they would have to pay the "public" fixed commission required 
of all nonmembers.18 This would reduce or eliminate any profit they 
15 
Ibid., 915 16 
Ibid., 934. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Members of an exchange pay a small commission to the exchange for all trades that 
they execute on the floor of the exchange. This commission helps cover the overhead costs of 
the exchange. Nonmembers who wish to trade on an exchange must ask a member to execute 
the trade on their behalf. The nonmembers pay the member a "public" commission for han 
dling the trade. Prior to 1975, all of the exchanges required their members to charge a speci 
fied minimum public commission. Since this was higher than what a free-market commis 
sion would have been, all members charged the specified minimum commission and did not 
compete for orders on the basis of price. The minimum public commission was specified on a 
per share basis, so large-volume institutional traders paid the same commission per share as 
small retail traders. In addition, with only minor exceptions, all the exchanges specified iden 
tical minimum public commissions. SEC, Special Study, part 2, 299-300. An investor could 
avoid paying the minimum commission by directing a trade in a listed security to an over 
the-counter dealer who made a market in that stock. But rule 394 of the NYSE prohibited 
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would gain from originating the order. If such firms, on the other hand, 
executed the order on the PHLX, they could keep most of the public 
commission paid by their customers, paying only a minor member 
commission to the PHLX. 
Firms that were solely members of the PHLX would direct some or 
ders to the NYSE, either because of the large size of the trade or be 
cause the security was not traded on the PHLX. They would have to 
choose a NYSE member to execute these orders on their behalf and pay 
the public commission. Because the cost to a member of executing an 
order on the NYSE was far below the minimum public commission, 
members competed aggressively to attract orders from outsiders. The 
NYSE did not permit its members to discount public commissions or 
offer cash rebates in competing to attract orders, but the members 
could reward outside brokerage firms that belonged to a regional ex 
change by sending them orders to execute on the regional exchange. In 
this way, the brokerage firm that belonged only to a regional exchange 
could indirectly earn public commissions for handling orders that it di 
rected to a NYSE member. Such orders were referred to as 
"reciprocal" 
order flow, and they accounted for a significant share of the trades di 
rected to the PHLX and other regional exchanges prior to the liberaliza 
tion of public commissions. 
The best-capitalized firms that were members of the PHLX often 
also belonged to the NYSE. In research conducted for its 1963 study, 
the SEC surveyed forty-one of these firms to ask them why they would 
direct some of their order flow to the PHLX rather than to the NYSE. 
About half of the firms cited one reason as the most important: "to re 
tain a larger percentage of the commission."19 This reason was likely 
mentioned by dual members that did not have execution and clearing 
facilities in New York, which meant that they would have to pay an 
other member of the NYSE to handle these tasks.20 Another common 
reason that the firms gave for directing orders to the PHLX was "to save 
paying the New York State transfer tax." At that time, New York im 
posed a graduated tax on the trading of stocks. For stocks that traded 
for $20 or more per share, the tax was $0.04 per share traded. Pennsyl 
vania had no such tax. Thirteen of the forty-one firms said they directed 
member firms from routing trading orders for listed stocks to OTC dealers. They were not, 
however, prevented from routing trades to regional exchanges. Rule 394 also prohibited 
NYSE member firms from acting as OTC dealers for listed securities. The effect of these rules 
was to limit access to the "third market" to institutional investors with the necessary technol 
ogy to communicate directly with OTC market makers and to compare the prices on the third 
market to those on the NYSE. 
19 SEC, Special Study, part 2,1086. 20 
Ibid, 938. 
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some trades to the PHLX to "reduce market impact on the NYSE." 
These firms were undoubtedly breaking up block orders. Several dual 
member firms reported that they directed trades to the PHLX as part of 
a reciprocal arrangement with another member of the PHLX. Finally, 
ten of the forty-one dual members said they directed some trades to the 
PHLX because of "orders originating in the vicinity of the exchange." 
Most likely they were referring to a desire by some Philadelphia-area 
investors, bank trust departments, and brokerage firms to support local 
business interests.21 
While securities markets were no longer regional by the 1950s, the 
NYSE-listed securities of large Philadelphia-area firms accounted for 
a disproportionate share of trades on the floor of the PHLX in the early 
1960s. Undoubtedly, the explanation for this circumstance is that 
ownership of firms in the Philadelphia area, especially at the retail 
level, was more concentrated in this region than elsewhere. When 
these owners traded their shares, they were more likely to use regional 
brokerage firms that were members of the PHLX. Between 1962 and 
1964, for example, the ten most actively traded stocks on the PHLX 
in one or more of these years included the Philadelphia Electric Com 
pany, the Scott Paper Company, the Sperry Rand Corporation, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and the Philadelphia Transportation 
Company.22 All of these companies were based in the Philadelphia 
metropolitan region. 
Despite the shift during the 1930s toward the trading of securities 
listed on the NYSE and AMEX, most of the regional exchanges experi 
enced a consistent decline in their market share of total exchange-listed 
trading between 1930 and i960. Many of the regional exchanges either 
closed or merged with others during this period.23 The PHLX was no 
exception. In 1949 it merged with the Baltimore exchange, and in 1953 
it merged with the Washington, D.C., exchange. In both cases, the 
PHLX was the far larger entity, and the surviving exchange maintained 
its headquarters in Philadelphia. Despite these mergers, the dollar vol 
ume of equity trading on the PHLX was quite low in the early 1950s 
21 In the late 1940s, the PHLX created a public relations committee to encourage Phila 
delphia-area financial institutions to direct trades to the PHLX in order to benefit the local 
economy. Apparently some institutions cooperated. The vice-president of a local trust bank 
stated, "We have encouraged our brokers to place as many of our orders as possible on the 
P-BSE [Philadelphia-Baltimore Stock Exchange]." James E. Walter, The Role of Regional 
Security Exchanges (Berkeley, 1957), 127. 22 
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1962 through 
1964. 
23 For a detailed analysis of the economic forces behind the mergers of the regional ex 
changes between 1940 and i960, see Tom Arnold, Philip Hersch, J. Harold Mulherin, and 
Jeffry M. Netter, "Merging Markets," Journal of Finance 54 (June 1999): 1083-107. 
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Figure 1. PHLX dollar volume of equity trading. Source: annual reports of the SEC. 
(see Figure 1).24 It picked up in the latter half of the 1950s, but this was 
largely due to a general increase in the volume of trading overall. Dur 
ing the 1950s, the market share that the PHLX had in exchange-traded 
equities hovered fairly consistently around 1 percent.25 In i960, the 
four largest regional exchanges had a combined market share of only 
6.15 percent. It is no wonder that the 1963 SEC study questioned the 
survival prospects of the regional exchanges. 
Shortly after the SEC issued its 1963 report, the flow of orders to 
the PHLX began to grow rapidly. The dollar volume of shares traded on 
the PHLX grew markedly from 1962 to 1969, and it grew explosively 
from 1970 through 1972, before declining just as precipitously between 
1972 and 1974 (see Figure 1). The growth in the dollar volume of trad 
ing on the PHLX between 1962 and 1968 was only sufficient to increase 
slightly its market share of exchange-traded equities. However, the ex 
plosive growth between 1969 and 1972 represented a 150 percent in 
crease in its market share. The 1972-74 fall in trading volume was due 
partly to a decline in overall volume in exchange-listed equities and 
partly to a decline in the market share of the PHLX. 
24 In Figure 1, the data from 1950-53 combine the volume of the PHLX and the Washing 
ton, D.C. exchanges. As noted in the text, the two exchanges merged in 1953. At the time of 
the merger, volume on the PHLX was fifty times larger than that on the D.C. exchange. 25 Table 1 in the appendix presents the overall dollar trading volume of exchange-listed 
securities and the market shares of the exchanges at five-year intervals. In this article, I re 
port market share as a percentage of the dollar value of trading, not the number of shares or 
contracts traded. 
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Much of the growth in the PHLX's trading volume between 1964 
and 1968 came from trades generated by mutual funds. As noted earlier, 
the NYSE and the regional exchanges imposed minimum public com 
missions with no volume discounts. Since the cost to a member firm of 
handling and executing a trade for a nonmember was well below the 
minimum commission, firms competed intensely to attract trading or 
ders from the public, especially large-volume trades. Had there been no 
rules to prevent it, brokerage firms that belonged to the NYSE would 
undoubtedly have begun to offer cash rebates to block traders who 
directed orders to them. But NYSE rules prevented members from issuing 
cash rebates to nonmembers. Members could only share commissions 
with other members. In the early 1960s, most of the regional exchanges 
had rules similar to those of the NYSE, stipulating that a member of an 
exchange could only share trading commissions with other members.26 
At the same time, the Investment Company Act of 1940 placed a 
cap on the commissions that mutual funds could pay retail sales orga 
nizations. Since mutual funds often wished to exceed this cap in order 
to sweeten the incentive for retail brokerage firms to sell shares in their 
funds, they found several ways to evade the cap. If a firm selling shares 
in the mutual fund was a member of the NYSE, the fund could reward 
the firm by asking it to execute trades on the fund's behalf, paying the 
firm the fixed commission for this service. If the mutual fund preferred 
to use its traditional NYSE-member firm for executing trades, it could 
direct that firm to share its trading commission with another NYSE 
member firm that the fund wished to reward. This was known as a 
"give-up." But many small brokerage firms that sold shares in mutual 
funds to retail clients were not members of the NYSE. However, there 
was a way to reward them for these sales if they were members of a re 
gional exchange. If the firm that traditionally executed trades for the 
mutual fund was also a member of a regional exchange, the fund could 
ask the firm to execute some trades on the regional exchange and share 
the commissions with another member of the regional exchange that 
the fund wished to reward. In the early 1960s, such arrangements 
accounted for a substantial share of the order flow on regional ex 
changes.27 The regional exchanges could handle the associated large 
block trades because the trades were often prearranged off the floor of 
the exchange. 
26 As of 1963, the Pacific Coast, Detroit, and Cincinnati exchanges permitted some dis 
counting of commissions for nonmember brokerage firms. SEC, Special Study, part 2, 936. 
As noted below, by the mid-1960s the PHLX and other regional exchanges joined these three 
exchanges in permitting a form of discounting through commission-sharing with nonmem 
ber brokerage firms. 
27 SEC, Special Study, part 2, 316-17. 
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In 1965, to attract even more business based on mutual fund 
directed give-ups, the PHLX changed its rules to permit commissions 
to be shared with brokerage firms that were not members of the 
PHLX.28 Since some small brokerage firms that sold shares in mutual 
funds were not members of any exchange, mutual funds could direct 
trading orders to the PHLX in order to reward them.29 
A second factor that increased the market share of the PHLX in the 
mid-1960s was an increase in taxes on security trades in New York City. 
The PHLX reported, "A one cent increase in the New York Stock Transfer 
Tax, from four to five cents during the year, advertised the fact that there 
had been no such tax for many years in any of the States where regional 
exchanges are located. This attracted block orders to all of them_"3? 
The New York Stock Exchange was, of course, unhappy to see 
trades that would normally be executed on its floor diverted to regional 
exchanges. It lobbied the SEC to halt all cash give-ups. The SEC agreed 
with the NYSE that give-ups could undermine fixed trading commis 
sions and weaken the cap on mutual-fund sales commissions. In De 
cember 1968, all commission splitting ended when the exchanges 
bowed to pressure from the SEC and agreed to ban the practice.31 
The loss of institutional business associated with the end of give 
ups could have been a major blow to the PHLX. It was not, however, 
because the PHLX instituted two new measures to attract institutional 
trades. In the 1960s, the NYSE did not allow institutions active in a 
wide range of activities to become members of the exchange. Member 
ship was open only to entities whose primary purpose was serving the 
public as brokers or market makers. In addition, the NYSE did not per 
mit foreign-owned securities firms to become members. This forced 
large foreign banks, many of which actively traded American securities 
on behalf of clients, to pay the public commission in order to trade on 
the NYSE. Prior to 1967, the PHLX had similar policies. But beginning 
in 1967, the PHLX allowed securities firms that were owned by mutual 
fund companies, insurance companies, foreign-owned financial institu 
tions or other institutions to become members.32 By early 1971, thirty 
28 
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1965. 29 Other regional exchanges adopted similar give-up provisions. As Business Week re 
ported, "[The regionals] raked in heavy trading from institutional investors because neither 
the Big Board nor the AMEX allowed give-ups of commissions to nonmembers. . . . Thus, 
whenever a mutual fund, for example, wanted to reward a small brokerage firm that sold its 
shares or provided research but which did not belong to any exchange, it could direct its bro 
ker to place an order through one of the six regionals that permitted give-ups to nonmem 
bers." Business Week, 3 Jan. 1970, 74. 
30 
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1966. 31 Business Week, 3 Jan. 1970, 74. 
32 Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (Boston, 1982), 396. 
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nine such institutionally affiliated securities firms had joined the PHLX 
and had begun to trade on behalf of the institutions that owned them.33 
The institutional investors still had to pay the minimum public com 
mission, but they paid it to firms owned by the institutions themselves. 
In this way, mutual funds and other institutions that traded high vol 
umes of equities effectively received a discount from public commis 
sions. Not surprisingly, this strategy was very successful for the PHLX. 
In 1968, 37 percent of its stock-trading volume came from institutional 
trades; by 1969, the amount had grown to 45 percent.34 
In 1968, the PHLX took a third measure to attract trading orders to 
the exchange. It doubled the number of seats, cutting the price of own 
ing a seat in half. This made it feasible for even very small brokerage 
firms to join the PHLX. If a mutual fund wished to reward these new 
members for selling shares in the fund, it could pay them the standard 
public commission for handling some trades. Business Week reported 
admiringly of the exchange, then known as the Philadelphia-Baltimore 
Washington (PBW) Exchange: 
In 1968, its volume was up 25% to 48 million shares from the previ 
ous year. In 1969, volume rose another 23%. Two moves initiated by 
the exchange's president, Elkins Wetherill, helped to keep trading 
volume high: Doubling the number of seats and allowing institu 
tions to become members. By cutting the cost of a seat in half (to 
$16,500), small firms that sell mutual funds and which once were 
rewarded with give-ups could join and receive commissions 
directly_The PBW is also picking up business by letting the insti 
tutions become members and save on commissions .... Liquidity is 
no problem because in the case of large blocks of stock both the sale 
and purchase (a so-called cross) are arranged beforehand and then 
executed on the floor of the exchange.35 
During the 1960s, not all regional exchanges were as successful as 
the PHLX. Several failed or were absorbed. One example was the Pitts 
burgh Exchange. By 1968, its share of the dollar value of all equity 
trades on exchanges had fallen to 0.03 percent.36 This was too little 
volume to justify operating the exchange, and in 1969 the PHLX agreed 
to absorb it. Within two years, the PHLX closed the trading floor in 
Pittsburgh. 
33 Elkins Wetherill, Testimony in Securities Industry Study, Part l, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. 
Senate, 92nd Congress, 21 Sept. 1971, 217-18. 
34 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1969. 
35 Business Week, 3 Jan.1970, 74. 
36 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 35th Annual Report (Washington, 
D.C., 1969), 193 
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The market share of the PHLX grew strongly between 1968 and 
1972. But over this same period, two serious threats appeared on the 
horizon. First, by the late 1960s there was much criticism of fixed trad 
ing commissions, and many influential groups were advocating deregu 
lation. Since much of the business of the PHLX came from institutions 
that were trying to evade fixed trading commissions, freeing the com 
missions could threaten the viability of the exchange. Beginning in 
1971, the exchange experienced a hint of this possibility. On April 5, 
1971, the SEC approved negotiated commission rates on orders above 
$500,000. This led institutions to redirect some of their large trades to 
the NYSE, as they could now negotiate discounted commissions. The 
SEC action explains much of the fall in the market share of the PHLX 
that began in 1972. 
In a second threat to the PHLX, beginning in 1972 the SEC began 
to pressure the exchanges to exclude from membership brokerage 
firms that were owned by institutional investors. The PHLX lobbied 
hard against this policy.37 But in 1975 Congress directed the SEC to 
adopt a ban on brokerage firms transacting business on behalf of affili 
ated institutional accounts. The ban was to become effective in 1978, 
but as it turned out this had little practical effect, since fixed trading 
commissions were liberalized in May 1975. 
An Era of Innovation: 1975-1983 
The liberalization of trading commissions could have sounded the 
death knell for the PHLX, but it did not, because the PHLX introduced 
an automated trading technology that met the needs of the emerging 
discount brokerage firms. It also began to trade equity options, which, as 
explained below, were largely immune to threats from other competing 
securities exchanges. And the PHLX created an options market for foreign 
currencies, benefiting for several years from its first-mover advantage. 
Equity Trading. Beginning in May 1975, exchanges were no longer 
permitted to specify minimum commissions for nonmembers trading 
with them. This led to a rapid fall in commissions, especially the com 
missions paid per share traded by institutional investors. Institutions 
that had been directing many of their trades to regional exchanges be 
gan to return to the NYSE. After all, it was the market with the most 
competitive bidding on the floor and the only exchange capable of ab 
sorbing fairly large trades in widely held equities. 
In 1978, there was a second major change in securities markets: the 
inauguration of the Intermarket Trading System (ITS). The ITS linked 
37 Business Week, 26 Feb. 1972, 22-23. 
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the floors of the exchanges, enabling traders on the floor of any ex 
change to see prices and transactions on all the others and to route or 
ders to another exchange. Traders were expected either to match or to 
exceed the best bid or offer price shown on any other exchange, known 
as the national best bid or offer (NBBO), or to route their orders to an 
exchange quoting the NBBO. 
Belying the terminology, a seller or buyer could conduct his or her 
transaction at the NBBO and still not receive the best price in the mar 
ket. The NBBO is the best quoted price to buy or sell a stock up to a 
specified quantity limit. But dealers and brokers are often reluctant to 
quote the very best price they are willing to pay. This is because they 
hope to pay less than the maximum figure, and because the maximum 
that they are willing to pay depends on how well informed they believe 
their counterparty is. If a well-informed counterparty wants to sell at 
price $X, the dealer can assume that the stock might well be worth less 
than $X. Quoting conservative bid-and-offer prices reduces the chances 
that the dealer will be taken advantage of by well-informed traders. 
However, when a typical "uninformed" retail order comes to the floor of 
an exchange such as the NYSE, where several brokers and dealers com 
monly compete to get such orders, the rivalry often forces them to offer 
prices superior to the best quoted bid-or-offer prices. This "price im 
provement" means that investors frequently obtained a price somewhat 
better than the NBBO. Price improvements were comparatively rare on 
the floors of the regional exchanges, since the specialists generally did 
not face competition for orders from dealers or brokers on their floors. 
The specialists on the regional exchanges would, as required, match the 
NBBO or send the trade to another exchange, but they generally did not 
match any price improvement that cropped up on the NYSE. 
The 1975 deregulation of brokerage commissions led to the rise of 
"discount" brokerage firms that charged low fees for providing basic re 
tail trading services. Since they charged low commissions for handling 
the trades, in order to make a profit they had to execute these trades at 
a very low cost. Moreover, since the profit on each trade was small, they 
scrambled to handle a high volume of retail trades. Thus, the discount 
brokers preferred fast, reliable, automated executions of their trades 
to time-consuming or costly searches for the best price possible for 
their customers' trades. Discount brokers argued that, in most cases, their 
customers gained more from low commissions than they would achieve 
from paying higher commissions to get the small price improvements 
often associated with less automated executions. 
The PHLX responded to the changes that diminished its order flow 
from institutional traders by developing systems to meet the needs of 
retail discount brokers. It hoped that a high volume of small-value order 
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flow could sustain the exchange and its members by providing two 
sources of revenue. First, the exchange could gain revenue, since it was 
paid for reporting trade-execution data to the "consolidated tape," a 
system that collected trading data from all the exchanges. Second, spe 
cialists on the exchange could profit from serving as consistent coun 
terparties to the retail trades, since the specialists' bid prices were al 
ways below their offer prices. But to attract the order flow from the 
emerging discount brokers, the PHLX had to offer automated, reliable 
executions at prices close to the best prices available anywhere. To do 
so, in 1975 the PHLX introduced a computerized system for handling 
and executing orders, called the Philadelphia Stock Exchange Auto 
mated Communication and Execution System, or PACE for short. 
PACE would route an entered retail order to the proper specialist. Or 
ders that met predetermined criteria could be executed automatically 
by the specialist, who would guarantee that the price of the trade would 
match the NBBO.38 
Partly in response to the automation of retail order flow by several 
of the regional exchanges and third-market dealers, the NYSE also au 
tomated much of its retail order flow by introducing its Designated Or 
der Turnaround System (DOT) in March 1976.39 But PACE was more 
fully automated than DOT, a factor that the discount brokers valued. 
The DOT system, for example, had a built-in delay to permit brokers on 
the floor to better the price offered by the specialist or displayed in the 
specialist's limit book. PACE did not have this feature. By late 1977, 
PACE accounted for about 12 percent of the PHLX's share volume, and 
the PHLX reported that "a great percentage of the volume coming 
through PACE is new order flow for the Exchange?orders which would 
have been diverted to other markets in the past."40 
38 
Competing on this basis became common for the regional exchanges and OTC dealers. 
As the SEC reported, "[Retail] orders are very rarely routed on the basis of quotations. In 
stead, order routing decisions are made on the basis of preexisting arrangements where ser 
vice and costs are paramount and execution quality is eliminated as a factor because all mar 
kets guarantee execution at the BBO. Once the order is routed this way, it is rare that it will 
be sent to another market because the best quote will be matched instead of rerouting the or 
der via ITS. Thus, market makers have little incentive to compete based on quotes. According 
to the Regional Exchanges, it is more effective to compete by marketing quicker and cheaper 
executions than by attempting to attract orders through displayed quotations." United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Market 2000 (Washington, D.C, 1994), A VI40. 39 The DOT system later evolved into SuperDOT. As with DOT, SuperDOT did not allow 
for fully automated executions since NYSE rules required the specialist to expose incoming 
orders to the crowd for possible price improvements. New York Stock Exchange Special 
Committee on Market Structure, Governance, and Ownership, Market Structure Report, 
2000, 24. 
40 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1977. Well into the 1980s, news accounts 
credited PACE with attracting significant retail order flow. Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 Apr. 
1986, C12. 
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Figure 2. PHLX dollar volume of equity trading. Source: annual reports of the PHLX. 
Between 1974 and 1983 the PHLX experienced a significant in 
crease in the dollar value of its equity trading volume (see Figure 2). 
But despite the PHLX's efforts to attract a high volume of retail trades, 
it lost market share relative to the combined share of the other ex 
changes. By 1983, its market share had declined to 1.5 percent from 2.3 
percent in 1974. In other words, despite the efforts of the PHLX to 
attract the order flow of retail trades, the exchange lost market share 
as large institutional orders returned to the NYSE following the 1975 
deregulation of fixed trading commissions. 
Stock and Index Options. On June 27, 1975, the PHLX began to 
trade options on equities. It was the third exchange to do so. The Chi 
cago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) had pioneered this path when it 
began to trade stock options in April 1973. Prior to that, options on 
equities had been traded only in an opaque over-the-counter market. 
Interest in trading options on the CBOE developed rapidly. In January 
1975, the American Stock Exchange became the second exchange to 
trade equity options. It was followed shortly afterwards by the PHLX 
and the Pacific Stock Exchange. 
When the PHLX introduced options trading, it started on a limited 
basis and expanded over time. Initially, for example, the PHLX traded 
only call options on five stocks.41 It slowly added other call options 
41 The buyer of a call option has the right, but not the obligation, to purchase a stock from the 
seller of the option at a predetermined price by a specified date. The buyer of a put option has 
the right to sell a stock to the seller of the put option at a predetermined price by a specified date. 
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over the next few years. The PHLX began to trade put options in June 
1977. 
The main reason that the PHLX was slow to add new equity op 
tions was that the CBOE and the AMEX were already trading the most 
desirable equity options by the time the PHLX began to look for con 
tracts to trade. Prior to 1977, although there was no rule preventing 
them from doing so, the exchanges rarely traded option contracts that 
were already traded on another exchange. People later charged that the 
options exchanges would not begin to trade an option contract traded 
on another exchange because of an implicit agreement to limit compe 
tition among the exchanges. In addition, the SEC and the exchanges ex 
pressed concerns about multiple trading of options contracts, since, 
unlike the equity exchanges, the options exchanges were not linked. 
This meant that there was no organized system to tell traders instantly 
on one exchange the quoted bid-and-offer prices and volumes on other 
exchanges. And there was no process to ensure that a trade on one ex 
change would not occur at a less favorable price than that available on 
another exchange.42 The SEC worried that public investors might be ex 
ploited in such fragmented markets and that the continuity and liquid 
ity of the markets could be impaired. 
Although the trading of the same option contract on more than one 
exchange was rare, it was becoming more common as the exchanges 
competed for order flow.43 In 1977, the SEC acted on its concerns about 
market fragmentation by placing a moratorium on the trading of new 
equity options while it studied the options market and considered how 
to handle the multiple-trading issue.44 Although the exchanges did not 
develop a linkage system during the moratorium, the SEC did not want 
to sustain the moratorium indefinitely, and it lifted it in March 1980. 
Still concerned about multiple trading on markets that were not linked, 
in June 1980 the SEC initiated a lottery for allocating the right to trade 
any new options on equities. Under this system, the exchanges would 
provide a list to the SEC of equity options that they wished to trade. The 
SEC would then use a lottery to allocate the exclusive right to trade 
these options to specific exchanges. This system remained in place until 
1990. Over these ten years, the options exchanges never developed a 
42 Traders on the floor of one exchange could follow prices and transactions on another 
exchange by obtaining data through third-party vendors, but this capability still would not 
provide the traders with an intermarket order routing system. 
43 Investment Dealer's Digest, 17 Aug. 1992,14. 
44 The PHLX supported this move: "The imposed options moratorium, temporarily at 
least, answers our request for the halt to dual option trading. Earlier in the year, the PHLX 
attempted to call attention to a so-called dual trading war which was occurring between the 
options exchanges in their attempts to capture increased order flow." Philadelphia Stock Ex 
change, Annual Report, 1977. 
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Figure 3. PHLX dollar volume of equity option trades. Source: annual reports of the SEC. 
system to link their markets, although they were persistently pressured 
by the SEC to do so. 
Under the SEC lottery system, the flow of option trades to the ex 
changes depended on their ability to attract business for the options 
they were trading prior to the moratorium of 1977 and on their luck in 
obtaining the right to trade new desirable equity options through the 
lottery. By these measures the PHLX did well. The volume of equity op 
tions traded on the exchange grew consistently between 1975 and 1983 
(see Figure 3). After 1978, the growth was particularly rapid. The mar 
ket share that the PHLX had in equity options hovered around 3 per 
cent between 1976 and 1978. During this period, the CBOE, with its 
first-mover advantage, had over 70 percent of the market. The AMEX's 
market share hovered around 20 percent.45 But the rapid growth in 
equity option trades on the PHLX between 1978 and 1983 resulted in a 
tripling of its market share. By 1983, it had almost 9 percent of the 
overall volume of exchange-traded equity options. This created bus 
tling activity on the options floor, for unlike the equity floor, it was ac 
tive with brokers and specialists, and with market makers trading for 
their own accounts.46 These were heady days among option traders 
45 Table 2 in the appendix provides data on the overall volume of equity options trading 
and the market shares of the exchanges. 
46 This was also true on the currency options floor during its best years. In both cases, the 
PHLX was a primary market in which national prices were set rather than, as in the case of the 
equity floor, a secondary market that based its prices on those determined by another exchange. 
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on the PHLX, and many boasted publicly of the easy money to be 
made.47 
At the end of 1983, there was a little-noticed development in op 
tions trading that would later benefit the PHLX. In December of that 
year, the exchange began to trade options on indices reflecting the price 
of the equities of firms in a particular economic sector.48 Since these 
options settled only in cash, one could consider them to be purely a bet 
on the market-weighted average price of stocks in a particular economic 
sector. The PHLX began with two such sector indices, a precious-metals 
index and a gaming-and-hotel index. Initially there was little trading 
volume in such sector index options, but that would change over time. 
Currency Options. Although the PHLX demonstrated foresight in 
moving relatively early to trade equity options, it could not claim to 
have pioneered this development. It simply copied the innovation 
launched by the CBOE. In the case of currency options, the PHLX was 
the innovator. 
In the late 1970s, there was a huge spot market in foreign curren 
cies and active over-the-counter forward and exchange-based futures 
markets. There was no organized market for foreign-currency options. 
Arnold Staloff, a staff member of the PHLX at the time, proposed that 
the PHLX should begin to trade options on foreign currencies. With the 
backing of PHLX management and some key members of the exchange, 
he started a long and complicated process to obtain approval from 
the SEC.49 One major complication was that laws in the United States 
treated foreign currencies as commodities, and the commodity exchanges 
were regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC). The CFTC and the Chicago-based futures exchanges were de 
termined to prevent SEC-regulated entities, such as the PHLX, from 
becoming centers for trading currency options. Since the SEC already 
regulated option trading in equities, it was equally determined to over 
see options on other financial instruments, including foreign currencies. 
After much political and legal maneuvering, the SEC and the CFTC finally 
reached a compromise, known as the Shad-Johnson Accord, in late 1981. 
Under the terms of the compromise, the SEC was to oversee exchange 
based trading in options on foreign currencies. Shortly afterward, the 
SEC permitted the PHLX to start trading foreign-currency options. 
47 Loren Feldman, "They're in the Money," Philadelphia Magazine, Dec. 1983,189-218. 48 Securities Week, 12 Dec. 1983,11. The CBOE was the first options exchange to trade a 
stock-market index option. It initiated trading on a broad market index in March 1983. New 
York Times, 11 Apr. 1983, D9. The CBOE and AMEX began trading index options on nar 
rower economic sectors in September 1983. Securities Week, 5 Sept. 1983, 9. 
49 For an entertaining account of the efforts by the PHLX to develop and market foreign 
currency options, see Gregory J. Millman, The Vandals Crown: How Rebel Currency Traders 
Overthrew the World's Central Banks (New York, 1995). 
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The PHLX opened its currency option trading floor on December 
10,1982. To help promote its new product, the PHLX initiated a series 
of seminars to explain to market professionals how it had structured its 
currency options market and to promote the use of exchange-traded 
currency options for hedging and speculation. In the first year of trad 
ing, the product appeared to be headed for success.50 Trading volume 
started small and grew slowly but steadily. Orders came from small 
scale speculators and from nonfinancial and financial businesses, many 
based in Europe, that used the exchange to hedge risks. 
Some Boom Years and Some New Threats: 1984-2000 
The period from 1984 through 2000 included some of the most 
successful years for the PHLX in modern times. Volume was heavy on 
almost all stock markets, including the PHLX. In addition, the two new 
products from the previous period?equity and currency options 
brought a very high volume of order flow and associated high incomes 
to many PHLX members for extended periods. 
At the same time, many members and managers of the exchange 
worried that the success was likely to be short lived. There were no bar 
riers to entry, other than the PHLX's first-mover advantage, that would 
protect its dominance of currency options. And the SEC repeatedly in 
dicated that it was dissatisfied with the monopolies held by the options 
exchanges in the majority of equity options. The SEC pushed hard for 
the options exchanges to create a linkage system and move to multiple 
listings. Few PHLX members held high hopes for the future of pure eq 
uity trading. The PHLX continued to lose market share in this arena, 
and its members felt a need for ever higher trading volumes as average 
profits per trade were squeezed by the need to pay for order flow and by 
narrowing spreads between bid and offer prices. 
These concerns, as well as the recognition that the PHLX would have 
to spend large sums to keep its software, hardware, and self-regulatory 
functions abreast of other exchanges, led to explorations of several 
merger possibilities with other exchanges between 1989 and 1993. None 
of these came to fruition, but several years later, in 1998, the PHLX 
came very close to merging with the AMEX.51 The merger was called off 
50 Financial Times, 6 Oct. 1983,116. 
51 In June 1998 the PHLX Board tentatively agreed to a merger proposal from the AMEX. 
It was reported that PHLX lagged in technology and thought it had to invest many millions of 
dollars to catch up. Investment Dealers Digest, 15 June 1998, 5-6. The AMEX, on the other 
hand, had state-of-the-art technology that allowed for electronic processing of orders, cancel 
lations, and replacement orders. The desire of the PHLX to gain AMEX's technology and the 
desire of the AMEX to gain PHLX's options business apparently motivated the merger. 
Under the terms of the merger, PHLX's options business would have moved to New York 
City. The merger plans were aborted in April 1999. 
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at the last minute, because major changes in the options industry 
raised serious doubts about whether it would be advantageous to both 
parties.52 
The period from 1984 to 2000 was not one that purely relied on the 
innovations from the previous era. During these fifteen years, the PHLX 
made one further significant innovation. In March 1988, after a two 
year costly development effort, the PHLX asked the SEC to approve its 
application to trade "cash index participations," or "CIPs" for short. 
The CIP was to trade like a stock but, like a futures index, its price 
would depend on the value of an index of stocks. Unlike a futures index, 
the CIP would pay a quarterly dividend based on the dividends of the 
stocks in the index, and it would have no expiration date. Shortly after 
the PHLX filed its application with the SEC, the AMEX and the CBOE 
applied to trade very similar products.53 The PHLX asked the SEC to 
permit it to trade CIPs for several months before giving the green light 
to the trading of similar products at the other exchanges, but the SEC 
gave its approval for the simultaneous launching of the products at all 
three exchanges. Soon after the CIP began to trade on the options floor 
of the PHLX, the CFTC brought a lawsuit, arguing that CIP-type products 
were futures contracts and should be regulated by the CFTC and traded 
on futures exchanges. In August 1989, a federal court ruled in favor of 
the CFTC and ordered the PHLX and the other exchanges to stop trad 
ing CIPs.54 They all did so, but the AMEX worked to redesign its CIP 
type product in order to avoid its designation as a product that should 
be traded on a futures exchange. 
55 In 1993, the AMEX introduced an 
"exchange traded fund," the replacement for the CIP. In subsequent 
years this became a highly successful product for the AMEX. 
In addition to creating the CIP, the PHLX opened a futures ex 
change, named the Philadelphia Board of Trade (PBOT), in May 1985.56 
The first securities traded on the PBOT were cash-settled options on 
Eurodollars futures and a futures contract on an over-the-counter 
52 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 Apr. 1999, Dl. 
53 A former official of the PHLX informed me during an interview that the PHLX and the 
other exchanges commonly faxed to each other copies of proposed routine rule changes so 
they could maintain a unified set of rules. According to this individual, an administrative 
assistant at the PHLX mistakenly faxed copies of PHLX's plans for the CIP to the other ex 
changes, enabling the other exchanges to immediately present the SEC with copycat proposals. 54 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 June 1990, El. Nicholas Giordano, the president of the PHLX 
at the time, was obviously frustrated with the CFTC. One trade journal quoted him as saying, 
"The CFTC should stick to what it is good at... like regulating pork bellies." Banker, 1 Jan. 
1990, 3. 
55 The PHLX had a futures exchange and could have reintroduced the CIP as a futures 
product, but it did not do so. In its view, the CIP could not succeed as a futures product, since 
far fewer brokers were qualified to trade futures contracts than spot contracts. 
56New York Times, 13 May 1985, D5. 
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Figure 4. PHLX dollar volume equity shares traded. Source: annual reports of the PHLX. 
stock-market index. Due to a lack of interest, the exchange stopped 
trading both products in 1986. In the same year, however, it introduced 
trading in futures contracts on a variety of foreign currencies. It hoped 
that traders on its currency options floor might direct trades to the 
PBOT to hedge their risk exposures. The PBOT had up-and-down years 
closely tied to the general activity in currency markets, but as a late en 
trant it never gained more than a tiny share of the foreign-currency 
futures market. In 1999, the PHLX closed the PBOT. Nevertheless, dur 
ing the years in which the PHLX hosted an equity-trading floor, an eq 
uity options floor, a currency options floor, and a futures market, it was 
the most diversified exchange in the country. 
Equity Markets. With the exception of just a few down years, eq 
uity trading volume on the PHLX grew strongly from 1984 through 
2000 (see Figure 4). This reflected the general boom in equity markets 
over this period, and, in fact, the market share of the PHLX fell despite 
the growth in the volume of trading. The growing order flow fed the 
profits of specialists on the PHLX and other exchanges. But there were 
offsetting developments that cut into the profits of specialists on the ex 
change and made it even more essential for specialists to attract a high 
volume of order flow. 
Specialists and OTC dealers competed to attract retail order flow, 
since they could profit from the spread between the bid and ask price. 
Not surprisingly, in competing for this order flow, specialists on the re 
gional exchanges and OTC dealers began to offer financial incentives to 
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brokerage firms that were willing to direct orders to them. This became 
known as 
"payment for order flow." Although it is not clear who initi 
ated the practice and when, by the mid-1980s there were reports that 
the practice was common among OTC dealers.57 Discount brokers, who 
were competing with each other to charge the lowest trading commis 
sion, were particularly likely to seek payments for order flow. These 
payments enabled them to cover their operating costs by means other 
than commissions. 
There is no record of when specialists on the PHLX began to pay 
for order flow, but the practice likely started in the mid-1980s.58 Al 
though it helped the specialists attract the order flow, it reduced their 
profits on each trade. Thus, the specialists' profits associated with the 
rapid increase in trading volume were less than they would have been 
had the specialists not had to pay for much of the order flow. 
The managers of the PHLX were acutely aware that the exchange 
needed to attract high volumes of orders to support the specialists on 
the equity floor. In the mid-1980s, they appealed to large financial in 
stitutions located in the Philadelphia metropolitan area to direct some 
of their stock-trading business to the PHLX.59 But this appeal appar 
ently had little effect.60 In February 1993, the PHLX began to trade se 
lected stocks that were listed on the NASDAQ.61 The SEC had approved 
this possibility on a limited basis in 1986, and on a more extensive 
basis in 1990. The Chicago Stock Exchange began to trade a subset of 
NASDAQ-listed stocks in May 1987 and attracted sufficient volume to 
maintain the effort. The PHLX thought that it too might attract order 
flow for several of the NASDAQ-listed stocks in which it had active op 
tions markets, but the effort was unsuccessful, and the PHLX halted 
trading in the NASDAQ stocks in early 1996.62 
In the late 1990s, spreads between bid and offer prices narrowed, 
which further reduced specialists' profits for a given volume of orders. 
57 Jane Sasseen, "Dirty Little Secret," Forbes, 17 June 1985, 203. 
58 The SEC announced in early 1986 that it would informally study the use of payment for 
order flow among dealers for listed securities on the exchanges. Securities Week, 17 Feb. 
1986,4. 
59 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 Apr. 1986, C12. 60 In interviews, two former presidents of the PHLX told me that Boston-area financial 
institutions have long supported the Boston Stock Exchange by ensuring that it receives 
some of their stock-trading orders. They lamented that, at least in the 1980s, Philadelphia 
area financial institutions were not equally supportive of the PHLX. This reminded me of the 
claim by the sociologist E. Digby Baltzeil that the wealthy families of Boston have always 
been much more civic spirited than upper-class Philadelphians. E. Digby Baltzeil, Puritan 
Boston and Quaker Philadelphia: Two Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Class Authority 
and Leadership (Free Press, 1979). As indicated by the title of his book, Baltzell attributed 
this difference to the religious heritages of the two cities. 61 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1992. 62 Securities Week, 7 Jan. 2002, 4. 
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One force behind the narrowing of spreads was the SEC-mandated con 
version from pricing in fractions of a dollar to pricing in decimals. 
Whereas prior to 1999 the narrowest possible spread was one-sixteenth, 
or $0.0625, by 2001, it was one penny. The switch to pricing in finer in 
crements achieved exactly what its advocates intended: it significantly 
narrowed average spreads.63 A second force behind the narrowing of 
spreads was SEC pressure. In response to its concerns about payments 
for order flow, the SEC indicated that it would look unfavorably on bro 
kers who routinely sent orders to markets offering NBBO without price 
improvements. This put pressure on the regional exchange specialists 
to trade at prices that were superior to the NBBO, enabling brokers who 
routed their trades to these exchanges to argue that their customers 
were receiving competitive prices. But such price improvement nar 
rowed the spread received by specialists. In June 1998, the PHLX mod 
ified PACE so that it would automatically offer a price that was superior 
by one-sixteenth to the NBBO for many trades.64 Subsequently, the 
PHLX continued to refine this automatic price-improvement feature. 
Under increasing pressure to generate higher volumes of trading 
orders for its equity floor, in mid-2000 the PHLX announced that it 
had formed a partnership with an electronic communication network 
(ECN). ECNs are computerized order-matching services that started in 
the late 1990s. By 2000, they had gained a significant share of trades in 
OTC stocks, but only a minor share of trades in exchange-listed stocks, 
a situation they were trying to remedy.65 But to display widely and 
promptly their quotes for exchange-listed securities, ECNs needed to 
gain access to the consolidated quote system (CQS) that the exchanges 
use. ECNs could show their quotes on NASDAQ's Computer Assisted 
Execution System (CAES), which interfaced with the Intermarket Trad 
ing System (ITS) that enabled trades to be routed to the floor of any of 
the equity exchanges. But many ECNs wanted no part of the ITS be 
cause they considered it to be unreliable and slow.66 For one thing, 
when Exchange A sent Exchange B a commitment to trade, Exchange B 
had up to two minutes to respond. For most automated trading opera 
tions, this was far too long to wait. 
The PHLX envisioned mutually beneficial opportunities as ECNs 
63 One recent study estimated that spreads narrowed by about 28 percent for NYSE-listed 
securities. See a report issued by Lehman Brothers written by Maureen Murphy and Luba 
Krayterman, "Trading Places: The Future of U.S. Equity Market Structure," 11 Feb. 2002,18. 
64 PR Newswire, 1 June 1998. 
65 
By 2001, ECNs handled about 5 percent of the volume in exchange-listed stocks. Mur 
phy and Krayterman, "Trading Places." 66 James McAndrews and Chris Stefanadis, "The Emergence of Electronic Communica 
tions Networks in the U.S. Equity Markets," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Is 
sues in Economics and Finance 6, no. 12 (2000). 
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Figure 5. PHLX dollar volume equity option trades. Source: annual reports of the SEC. 
sought to increase their volume of trading in exchange-listed stocks. In 
June 2000, it announced an agreement with the Bloomberg Trade 
book, an ECN that mainly served institutional investors.67 Under the 
agreement, Bloomberg could go through the PHLX to post its quotes on 
listed securities on the CQS. The PHLX, in turn, hoped to gain equity 
order flow from the Bloomberg agreement and get transaction and 
market-data fees from any trades that Bloomberg generated. The 
PHLX announced that it would like to strike similar deals with other 
ECNs.68 While such efforts to increase order flow on the equity floor of 
the PHLX might pay off over time, by 2000 the market share of the ex 
change had fallen to an all-time low (0.6 percent), making it the small 
est exchange for equities. 
Equity and Index Options. The volume of trading in equity options 
on the PHLX was relatively stable from 1983 to 1989, despite the 1985 
entry of the NYSE into the equity options market (see Figure 5). The 
NYSE was simply too late. It could not use its dominance of exchange 
based equity trading to gain more than a tiny toehold in the options 
market. When the NYSE entered the market, other exchanges were al 
ready trading the most desirable options, and dual trading of options 
67 Securities Week, 12 June 2000,1. 68 Other regional exchanges, most notably the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, also used busi 
ness relationships with ECNs to bring trading orders to their floors. In 2002, the ECN Archil 
pelago took over the equity trading floor of the Pacific Stock Exchange, effectively gaining all 
the privileges of an exchange. Financial Times, 3 Apr. 2002, 4. 
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on exchange-traded stocks was not permitted. Prior to 1990, the only 
way that the NYSE could trade an option on an exchange-listed stock 
was to participate in the SEC's lottery. Even after 1993, when the SEC 
began to allow multiple trading for all stock options, the NYSE, like the 
other exchanges, chose not to trade options that had been allocated to 
other exchanges through the lottery. After more than a decade of fight 
ing to build its options business under such restrictions, in 1997 the 
NYSE gave up, shutting down its options trading floor. 
The PHLX, along with other options exchanges, experienced a 
slump in the volume of options trading between 1990 and 1992. This is 
commonly attributed to the end of the corporate takeover era associ 
ated with the failure during the 1990s of Drexel Burnham and the cre 
ation of more effective corporate takeover defenses.69 In the late 1980s, 
a substantial share of the business in options came from individuals 
and institutions speculating on possible takeover targets. 
The volume of options trading on the exchanges picked up in 1992, 
but the PHLX participated in very little of this growth. The PHLX lost 
significant market share in equity option trades between 1989 and 
1995. Much of this decline was simply due to bad luck, as the PHLX did 
not happen to trade some of the equity options that experienced the 
highest volume of trading in this period. 
The luck of the PHLX turned around in the mid-1990s. Beginning 
in 1996, there was a general boom in equity option trading, much of 
which represented speculation or hedging in the stocks of high-flying 
technology companies. Since many of these firms were relatively 
young, the CBOE and the AMEX were not generally trading options on 
their stocks before the PHLX entered options trading. Thus, the PHLX 
share of the option contracts on the stocks of these firms was almost 
equivalent to that of any other exchange. When the boom began, the 
PHLX was well positioned to participate. Between 1996 and 1998, the 
PHLX saw rapid growth in trading on its equity options floor (see Fig 
ure 5). In fact, the explosive volume led to serious problems for the 
PHLX, since its trade routing, executing, and reporting technologies 
were antiquated and could not keep up with the order flow in its most 
active options.70 This situation hurt the reputation of the exchange and 
cost it potential business. Nevertheless, as reflected in the price of seats 
to trade equity options, these were boom times. The highest price paid 
for a seat to trade equity options on the PHLX in 1993 was $20,000. By 
1998, it was $305,ooo.71 
69 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 26 Sept. 1990, E10. 
70 Wall Street Journal, 27 Apr. 1999, B30 
71 Data provided to the author by the PHLX. 
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The PHLX introduced trading in sector-index options in 1983. 
Shortly afterward, the PHLX also began to trade options on broad 
equity-market indices. At first there was only modest interest in the 
PHLX's index options. But order flow for index options grew very rap 
idly between 1992 and 1999. Trading in the PHLX's sector-index op 
tions was particularly strong. As the PHLX reported, "Three of the Ex 
change's [sector index options]... are by a significant margin the most 
actively traded instruments of their type in the securities industry."72 
Although equity options were a major success for the PHLX from 
1984 through 1999, the exchange could never be sure that this success 
would last. During the 1980s, the PHLX and the other options ex 
changes had a legal monopoly in the trading of many of their most ac 
tive options. The SEC had created this situation because of its concern 
that multiple trading of identical option contracts among unlinked 
markets would be detrimental to public investors. 
The SEC pressed the options exchanges to create a linkage system 
during the period when it allocated exclusive trading rights via a lot 
tery. But the options exchanges failed to create such a system, even 
after a decade of discussions.73 Frustrated, the SEC decided to end the 
monopolies that the exchanges enjoyed in option contracts while con 
tinuing to push the exchanges to create a linkage system. The SEC took 
an incremental approach. In 1985, it announced that the right to trade 
options on OTC stocks would not be allocated through a lottery. These 
options could be traded on multiple exchanges. In January 1990, the 
SEC ended its lottery system for allocating options on exchange-listed 
stocks. The SEC ruled that henceforth any new options that an ex 
change began to trade could also be traded on another exchange. These 
changes in policy had only a modest effect. In August 1992, only 111 of 
1,000 equity options traded on more than one exchange.74 At the close 
of 1992, the PHLX traded 228 equity options. Only 31 of these were 
traded on other exchanges.75 In November 1992, the SEC began to lift 
exclusive trading privileges for the approximately 500 equity options 
allocated through the lottery system prior to 1990. It did so in stages, 
starting with the least actively traded options. By the mid-1990s, all re 
strictions on multiple trading had been lifted, but the exchanges still 
chose not to trade options that had been allocated to other exchanges 
under the lottery system. In mid-1999, about 60 percent of equity op 
tions still traded on only one exchange, and these included almost all of 
72 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1994. 
73 Wall Street Journal, 6 Oct. 1999, C20. 
74 Investment Dealers Digest, 17 Aug. 1992,14. 75 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Annual Report, 1992. 
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the most active options.76 The PHLX, for example, was the only ex 
change to trade options in Dell Computers prior to late 1999. This was 
an extremely active option, as alone it accounted for 30 to 50 percent of 
the volume in equity options on the PHLX during much of 1999. 
Despite the strong volume of order flow to the PHLX options floor 
in early 1999, many people were highly pessimistic about the continu 
ing health of this business. And, in fact, a number of their worries soon 
materialized. Several large securities firms, for example, announced in 
1998 that they were investing in the creation of an all-electronic op 
tions exchange, to be known as the International Securities Exchange 
(ISE). The backers of the ISE also announced that this exchange would 
trade option contracts traded on other exchanges. In other words, it 
planned to break the monopolies that the exchanges had enjoyed with 
many active options contracts. 
A second threat was the escalating pressure that the SEC and the 
U.S. Justice Department were applying to induce the options exchanges 
to trade the other exchanges' active options. By the late 1990s, the re 
luctance of the options exchanges to compete for other exchanges' op 
tion contracts led the SEC and the Justice Department to charge that 
there was a 
"gentlemen's agreement" among the exchanges not to com 
pete. Both agencies filed suit. The exchanges denied the charge, but in 
2000 they agreed to spend millions to improve self-regulation as part 
of a settlement with the Justice Department and the SEC. The PHLX, in 
particular, committed to spend $8 million. The PHLX also paid $2.8 
million in 2000 to settle a class-action lawsuit, in which it had been 
accused of increasing option spreads by squelching competition. 
By late 1999, litigation threats from the SEC and the Justice De 
partment and the threat by the ISE to trade other exchanges' most ac 
tive option contracts finally achieved the result that the SEC desired. In 
August 1999 the CBOE and AMEX broke the alleged gentlemen's agree 
ment when they began to trade options in Dell Computers. They imme 
diately attracted a significant share of the Dell order flow away from the 
PHLX. Not surprisingly, the PHLX retaliated by initiating trading in 
several of the most actively traded option contracts on the CBOE and 
AMEX.77 
Option traders on the floor of the PHLX did have some good news 
in 1999. As noted earlier, in the mid-1990s the computerized trading 
76 Financial Times, 19 Aug. 1999, 28. 
77New York Times, 24 Aug. 1999, C3. Multiple listing occurred despite the lack of an in 
termarket linkage system. In October 1999, SEC chairman Arthur Levitt reprimanded the 
options exchanges for failing to comply with his request (made in February) that they link 
their markets. He gave them ninety days to come up with a plan for doing so, and they did. 
The plan was phased in between 2001 and 2003. 
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systems of the PHLX, especially for options, were antiquated and could 
not handle especially high volumes of trading activity. Gaining access 
to better trading technology had been much of the impetus for the 
merger discussions of the late 1990s. While those discussions were un 
derway, the PHLX began a costly but intentionally low-profile internal 
effort to improve its systems. In early 1999, almost at the same time as 
it announced that merger plans with the AMEX were no longer under 
consideration, it unveiled new computerized trading systems.78 The 
systems were widely recognized to be state-of-the-art. The trading tech 
nology of the PHLX ceased to be an issue. 
Over the course of 2000, the four major options exchanges (CBOE, 
AMEX, PHLX, and Pacific Stock Exchange [PSE]) increasingly added 
trading in the option contracts that were most active on other ex 
changes. This competition became even more heated when the new, all 
electronic ISE options exchange opened for business in May 2000 and 
lived up to its promise to immediately begin trading the option con 
tracts active on other exchanges. 
Many people had argued that multiple trading of options contracts 
might be particularly damaging to the PHLX, since it had a relatively 
small market share and depended heavily on a small number of active 
options contracts. These worries had partly motivated earlier efforts by 
the PHLX to merge with another exchange. Contrary to these concerns, 
the move to multiple trading benefited the PHLX within the near term, 
partly because of the way the PHLX managed it. When the CBOE and 
the AMEX began to trade the Dell options that were the backbone of 
the PHLX in the late 1990s, the PHLX immediately retaliated by per 
mitting several of its specialists to begin trading some of the options that 
were most active on the other exchanges. After that, however, it proceeded 
at a more deliberate pace. The exchange would announce plans to trade 
an option contract that was active on another exchange. But rather than 
allocating the specialist position to one of the firms already active on 
the PHLX, it would offer it to a large specialist operation that had not 
previously traded on the PHLX. In this way, the PHLX used the oppor 
tunity to trade desirable new options contracts to entice the largest and 
best capitalized specialist firms to become active on the PHLX.79 Since 
such firms could attract orders based on their reputations and capital, 
this tactic augmented the volume of trading on the options floor. 
78 Wall Street Journal, 27 Apr. 1999, B30. 
79 The PHLX also encouraged specialist firms that were not able to attract significant or 
der flow to transfer their specialist positions to other firms that might be able to attract more 
business. It did this by levying a fee on all specialist firms. The fee was based on the assump 
tion that the firms have 10 percent of the aggregate exchange-traded order flow in their op 
tion contacts. 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Thu, 17 Jul 2014 14:21:19 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
John P. Caskey / 482 
As the exchanges competed for each other's order flows, it is per 
haps not surprising that the specialists on the various exchanges began 
to pay for order flow.80 In July 2000, the CBOE escalated this competi 
tion by instituting a system that effectively taxed all specialists and 
market makers to raise funds for order-flow payments. The PHLX an 
nounced that it opposed this exchange-sponsored system of payment 
for order flow. But it also made clear that it would not sit on the side 
lines while others took its business. In August 2000, the PHLX insti 
tuted a system similar to that of the CBOE, but attached even higher 
fees to its specialists and market makers and required higher order 
flow payments. This policy, along with the increasing presence of large 
specialist firms trading on the PHLX, helped feed a boom in PHLX or 
der flow in late 2000 and early 2001.81 
Although the PHLX handled a record volume of equity option 
trades in 2000, it had reason to be concerned about the future. Compe 
tition among specialists trading the same option contracts on different 
exchanges, as well as the shift to decimal pricing for equities, had nar 
rowed spreads between bid and offer prices.82 This, along with pay 
ments for order flow, made it more important than ever to sustain a 
high volume of trading to support market-makers on the exchange. In 
addition, the PHLX faced a new competitor in the all-electronic ISE. 
Times were good on the option floor in 2000, but there was little room 
for complacency. 
Currency Options. As the PHLX worked to promote its fledgling 
currency options market in 1983, large commercial and investment 
banks increasingly began to write tailor-made currency option con 
tracts for their corporate customers who were looking for better ways to 
hedge exchange-rate risks.83 The banks hedged their own net risk expo 
sures by taking appropriate positions in the spot market or the futures 
market, by trading currency options with each other in a developing 
OTC market, and by trading options on the PHLX.84 When the banks 
traded on the PHLX, their orders were generally far larger than the spe 
cialists and market makers could handle. The banks would therefore 
use a broker to find another institution, generally another bank, willing 
to take the other side of the trade. Once two parties agreed to the terms 
80 Laura Johnson, "'Payment for Order Flow' Seeps into Options Markets," Wall Street 
Letter, 25 Oct. 1999,1-2. 
81 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 21 Jan. 2001, El. 82 SEC chairman Levitt reported, "In four of the five actively traded options we examined, 
effective spreads have fallen between 22 and 44 percent since these options went from single 
exchange trading to multiple listings." Arthur Levitt, "The Future of Our Markets: Dynamic 
Markets, Timeless Principles," Columbia Business Law Review (Winter 2000): 8. 
83 American Banker, 24 Jan. 1984,1. 
84 Ibid., 17 Jan. 1985,16. 
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Figure 6. PHLX volume of currency option contracts traded. Source: annual reports of the 
PHLX. 
of the trade, they would execute it on the floor of the exchange. Market 
makers on the floor would not interfere with these block trades. This 
practice enabled the exchange to handle large trades smoothly, and it 
contributed to the rapid growth in trading volume between 1983 and 
1987 (see Figure 6). 
By mid-1984, it was clear that the PHLX had become the dominant 
trading center for what could become a very large market. Financial of 
ficers at large, internationally active firms who never knew that Phila 
delphia had a stock exchange were now acutely aware of its presence.85 
The success that the PHLX was having with currency options was not 
lost on other exchanges, several of which also began to trade them. The 
Chicago Board Options Exchange began to trade currency options in 
September 1985, two years after the PHLX initiated the market. But it 
could never overcome Philadelphia's first-mover advantage, and few 
traders could see any reason to divert order flow from the PHLX.86 In 
August 1987, the CBOE withdrew from the business.87 
Much of the order flow for currency options came from institutions 
85 Financial Times of London, 2 Oct. 1984,113. 86 Journal of Commerce, 3 Aug. 1987, 7B. 
87 When the CBOE stopped trading currency options, its president remarked, "History 
keeps proving that the first one there (in the market) is the most likely to succeed." Chicago 
Tribune, 3 Aug. 1987, B7. 
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in Europe, especially London.88 Not surprisingly, the European exchanges 
resented the domination of the business by an American exchange. In 
mid-1985, the London Stock Exchange and the London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) started to trade cur 
rency options.89 Similarly, the French futures exchange, the March? ? 
Terme International de France (MATIF), started trading currency op 
tions in early 1994.90 But none of these competitors were able to dis 
place the dominance of the PHLX in exchange-traded currency options. 
After several years of rapid growth, the volume of trades on the 
PHLX leveled off between 1987 and 1990 (see Figure 6). This was prima 
rily due to the growth of the OTC market and the creation of exchange 
rate bands for the European currencies that belonged to the European 
Monetary System. The reduced volatility of these currencies relative to 
each other reduced the demand to hedge currency risks and limited op 
portunities for speculation. Nevertheless, this was a halcyon era for many 
currency options traders on the PHLX, who reaped substantial profits 
from market-making and speculating on the floor of the exchange that 
dominated currency options. Growth in trading volume resumed with 
the turmoil among European exchange rates in the early 1990s.91 
After the peak in 1993, the volume of trading in currency options 
on the PHLX started a precipitous decline. By 2000, trading volume 
was so low as to be an insignificant part of the business of the exchange. 
This decline was mainly caused by the continued growth of the OTC 
market. Many corporations preferred to hedge in the OTC market, 
since banks would tailor contracts to their specific needs.92 In addition, 
the major international banks that had provided much of the order flow 
to the PHLX began to deal exclusively in the OTC market. By the early 
1990s, this market was well developed, and it had numerous very well 
capitalized market makers. As the market developed in the mid-1980s, 
the option contracts that banks traded among each other to hedge their 
net exposures became somewhat standardized, adding to their liquidity.93 
A study issued by the International Monetary Fund reported as follows: 
The development of an extensive and sophisticated OTC market 
structure in the 1980s and 1990s with many of the world's largest 
financial institutions serving as market makers has greatly enhanced 
88 Nicholas Giordano, then the president of the PHLX, stated, "60% of our volume in for 
eign exchange options comes from overseas hedgers and traders." New York Times, 13 May 
1985, D5. 
89 Financial Times, 5 Aug. 1985,15. 
90 Ibid., 28 July 1994, 25. 
91 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 Sept. 1992, A16. 
92 Investment Dealers Digest, 7 Sept. 1992, 5. In 1994, the PHLX introduced customized 
currency options contracts in an effort to compete with the OTC, but these never gained 
much market share from the banks. 
93 Financial Times, 11 Dec. 1985, III6. 
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the liquidity of OTC derivatives markets. This, in turn, has lowered 
the cost of participation and supported the expansion of the mar 
ket. Measured by notional principal, OTC derivative markets have 
grown to roughly nine times the size of those for exchange-traded 
derivatives... ,94 
One close observer of the PHLX market added another reason for 
the shift in business to the OTC market by banks and other large institu 
tions.95 He explained that as the currency options floor of the exchange 
grew, market makers on the floor began to behave more aggressively, 
insisting on participating in large trades that had been negotiated off 
the floor of the exchange. This fragmented the large orders and frus 
trated the institutions that were trading them through the PHLX. Many 
responded by shifting all their trades to the OTC market.96 
Conclusion 
This account of the evolution of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
from the 1950s through 2000 takes an important step toward correct 
ing the general neglect of the role of the regional exchanges in securi 
ties markets. In addition, it makes two points. First, as is widely recog 
nized, there is a tendency for trading to flow to the market with the 
greatest liquidity. While the history of the PHLX provides substantial 
support for this proposition, it also illustrates that other factors have 
shaped order flow to securities markets. These include government reg 
ulations, differentiated trading technologies across markets, limita 
tions on access to leading exchanges, and, possibly, collusive behavior. 
Second, the evolution of the PHLX illustrates how one small securities 
exchange could adapt to survive in an industry subject to profound reg 
ulatory and competitive shocks. In each decade examined in this study, 
the PHLX's main business was very different from what it had been in 
the preceding decade. In the 1950s, the PHLX was a small equities ex 
change whose order flow came mainly from regional brokerage firms 
that were not members of the NYSE. By the 1990s, the PHLX was trading 
equity and currency options, and its equity floor was highly automated, 
mainly serving discount brokerage firms throughout the country. 
94 
Garry J. Schinasi et al., Modern Banking and OTC Derivates Markets: The Transfor 
mation of Global Finance and its Implications for Systemic Risk, Occasional Paper #203. 
(Washington, D.C., 2000), 64. 
95 Author's interview with Arnold Staloff, 17 Sept. 2002. 96 In late 1993, the PHLX tried to prevent the fragmentation of large currency option 
trades by stating that orders of more than one thousand contracts could be required to exe 
cute at a single price. Securities Week, 15 Nov. 1993, 5. Unfortunately for the PHLX, by this 
time most block traders had already shifted to the OTC market or were planning to do so, and 
thus were not willing to return to the PHLX. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Market Shares of Dollar Volume of Equity Trades by Exchange 
Total $ 
Volume 
Year (in millions) NYSE AMEX CHX PSE" PHLX" BSE CSE 
1950 21,808 85.91 6.85 2.35 2.19 1.03 1.12 0.11 
1955 38,039 86.31 6.98 2.44 1.90 1.03 0.78 0.09 
1960 45,310 83.80 9.35 2.72 1.94 1.03 0.60 0.07 
1965 89,549 81.78 9.91 3.44 2.43 1.12 0.42 0.08 
1970 131,708 78.44 11.11 3.76 3.81 1.99 0.67 0.30 
1975 157,257 85.20 3.67 4.64 3.26 1.73 1.19 0.17 
1980 476,501 83.53 7.33 4.33 2.27 1.61 0.52 0.40 
1985 1,200,128 85.25 2.23 6.59 3.06 1.49 1.20 0.18 
1990 1,616,798 86.15 2.33 4.58 2.77 1.79 1.63 0.74 
1995 3,507,991 87.71 2.10 3.26 2.24 1.27 1.43 1.99 
2000 13,691,342 81.93 5.53 7.58 1.19 0.62 1.87 1.26 
aThe market shares of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and the Pacific Stock Exchange 
include the shares of the exchanges that were incorporated into them through mergers. 
Source: SEC annual reports. 
Abbreviations: NYSE, New York Stock Exchange; AMEX, American Stock Exchange; 
CHX, Chicago Stock Exchange; PSE, Pacific Stock Exchange; PHLX, Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange; BSE, Boston Stock Exchange; CSE: Cincinnati Stock Exchange; CBOE, Chi 
cago Board Options Exchange. 
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Table 2 
Market Share of Equity Option Sales by Exchange*1 
Total $ Volume 
of Equity 
Options Traded AMEX NYSE PSE PHLX CBOE 
Year (in millions) (96) (96) (96) (96) (96) 
1976 11,734 19 0 1 3 77 
1977 10,899 17 0 4 3 69 
1978 18,953 19 0 4 3 72 
1979 23,158 26 0 4 5 60 
1980 45,873 27 0 4 6 61 
1981 41,423 33 0 5 9 54 
1982 53,660 27 0 5 8 60 
1983 59,599 25 0 6 9 60 
1984 33,822 26 0 8 10 55 
1985 29,544 28 0 10 8 53 
1986 40,054 32 1 9 9 49 
1987 53,123 31 1 1 9 49 
1988 27,164 33 2 10 11 44 
1989 40,423 27 2 11 12 48 
1990 27,219 30 2 12 10 46 
1991 27,104 34 1 3 9 42 
1992 26,586 35 2 12 9 42 
1993 33,779 34 1 2 8 45 
1994 35,883 29 1 4 8 47 
1995 50,803 29 1 9 7 44 
1996 67,862 33 1 15 7 44 
1997 104,535 33 0 17 9 40 
1998 140,261 32 0 16 11 4  
1999 260,294 28 0 16 8 48 
2000 481,440 28 0 17 15 40 
a Includes stocks, rights, and warrants. 
Source: SEC annual reports. 
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